Login | April 16, 2024
Taking justices to task for overreach
DAVID J. ROBINSON
Law Bulletin columnist
Published: December 15, 2017
When a criminal defendant challenges his conviction on direct appeal, arguing that the state failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the standard of review for the appellate court is as follows: When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could any rationale trier of fact find the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pursuant to this standard, a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.
This standard seems straightforward enough, but occasionally a case comes along that makes practitioners scratch their collective head.
In People v. Lee, 2017 IL App (1st) 151652, the appellate court issued an opinion in which it reversed an aggravated battery conviction following a bench trial.
The reviewing court concluded that because the defendant, Jimmy Lee, who had been previously diagnosed as schizophrenic, but presented no evidence that he was suffering from an episode at the time, had “inadvertently” struck his attending nurse, the state had failed to prove the requisite “intent” required under the aggravated battery statute. The crime was “aggravated” due to the status of the victim as a nurse.
In order to prove aggravated battery, at a minimum, the state was required to show that Lee committed a battery — that is, that he made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature — on a person he knew to be a nurse in the performance of her duties.
Lee, having waived a jury trial, requested that the trial judge act as trier of fact. Among other evidence, the following information was presented at trial: (1) by Lee’s own testimony, Lee knew the victim was a nurse performing her duty at the time (in fact, he had been hospitalized there in the past and knew her personally); and (2) by stipulation, Lee deliberately struck the nurse and then bumped her before being restrained by hospital security.
Although the parties appeared to have agreed that Lee had been previously diagnosed as a schizophrenic, no evidence was presented that he was suffering from an episode at the time of the battery (indeed, the special concurrence pointed out that “Lee’s condition did not interfere with his capacity to consent, refuse consent or withdraw consent.”).
This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, appears to have been sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of aggravated battery. So why reverse? Here is the rest of the story.
Lee had been admitted to the hospital after attempting suicide, apparently upset about his partner and children being involved in a vehicle accident (an accident that apparently resulted in at least one fatality).
The victim, a nurse, attempted to remove Lee’s necklace (which had a cross on it) because the hospital policy was to remove all items that could potentially be used to hurt the patient or a staff member — indeed, the nurse testified that she had seen a patient commit suicide with similar items.
The nurse attempted to remove the necklace and Lee resisted, ultimately striking the nurse in the forehead with the cross. Lee then threw the cross to the floor, and when the nurse walked over to retrieve it, Lee stood over her and threatened to kill her.
The state played a surveillance video, which corroborated the interaction. The nurse left the room with a red mark on her forehead, which caused her pain for several hours.
The appellate court reversed Lee’s conviction, pointing to a significant amount of circumstantial evidence that Lee did not intend to strike the nurse. Yet, all of that evidence was presented to the judge as trier of fact, who apparently rejected it, accepting instead the parties’ stipulation that Lee deliberately struck her.
Justice Michael B. Hyman specially concurred to point out (1) the need to “honor the decisions of competent patients, like Lee, to limit medical treatment” and (2) the concern that there is a tendency to criminalize the behavior of the mentally ill.
Respectfully, the Lee court, particularly the special concurrence, overlooked two important points:
First, Lee’s decision to wear a necklace was not a “decision to limit medical treatment” that must be “honored” — in fact, according to the evidence, the nurse’s failure to remove it would have violated protocol which would have no doubt subjected her and the hospital to potential civil liability.
Second, criminalizing the conduct of individuals who may be mentally ill is not a decision that is made haphazardly. And, in fact, no evidence in this case suggests that this case was not brought without those considerations by an elected state’s attorney charged by oath with making those decisions.
Moreover, Lee was represented by counsel and testified in his own defense under the thoughtful supervision of a trial judge (who, by the way, found him competent to waive a jury trial).
Society trusts elected state’s attorneys, members of the defense bar, and trial judges to make sound decisions about charging cases, defending cases and overseeing cases, respectively.
The appellate court should too.
David J. Robinson is a lawyer, adjunct professor, author and 4th District deputy director at the state’s attorneys appellate prosecutor.