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7th District affirms juvenile’s life sentence for fatal robbery

TRACEY BLAIR
Legal News Reporter

Published: January 25, 2022

The 7th District Court of Appeals has affirmed the life sentence of a defendant who was involved in a deadly armed robbery when he was a juvenile.
Ka’Saun Carlock took part in an armed robbery of Dylan Monroe, which resulted in Monroe’s death, on Aug. 18, 2018. A Jefferson County trial court sentenced the then-15-year-old to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 18 years.
Carlock previously pleaded guilty plea to murder, aggravated robbery and tampering with evidence after defense counsel and the state jointly agreed to recommend the sentence, which included three years for a firearm specification.
On appeal, Carlock argued the sentence is unconstitutional due to the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in State v. Patrick. He alleged the trial court was required to, and failed to, articulate its consideration of his youth as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence even though the sentence contains a possibility of parole.
Carlock also argued that because R.C. 2929.02(B) does not allow for any individualized consideration of youth, its mandatory life-tail sentence is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. He claimed the Eighth Amendment now bars mandatory life-with-the-possibility-of-parole sentences for juvenile offenders because such sentences prevent the sentencing judge from accounting for youth and defining characteristics.
“Initially, we must note that appellant failed to object to his sentence upon constitutional grounds before the trial court,” appellate Judge Gene Donofrio said in his 3-0 opinion. “In fact, he agreed to the sentence as part of his plea deal with the state.”
Carlock cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 Miller v. Alabama decision to support his argument. In Miller, the high court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.”
He also cited State v. Long (2014-Ohio-849) which held “[a] court, in exercising its discretion under R.C. 2929.03(A), must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a sentence of life without parole.”
In addition, Carlock alleged the Patrick case extended State v. Long to juvenile life sentences with the possibility of parole.
The state argued Patrick does not apply in Carlock’s case because Patrick was solely focused on whether Long applied to an aggravated murder sentence when the sentence was something less than life without the possibility of parole. Citing State v. Starling, the state alleged Patrick was focused on R.C. 2929.03(A)(1) and the trial court’s task of choosing among various life sentences.
In Starling, the 2nd District held that because the juvenile, who would be considered for parole after having served 15 years in prison, the rationale in Miller and Long did not apply. The court further rejected the argument that mandatory sentences imposed on juveniles in adult court are invalid as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
“Recently, in State v. Fuell, the 12th District addressed an identical situation as in the case at bar,” Judge Donofrio noted. “In that case, Fuell was 17 years old at the time of his offense. His case was bound over from juvenile court to the common pleas court. Fuell eventually pleaded guilty to murder and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 15 years. On appeal, Fuell argued that R.C. 2929.02(B)(1)’s mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after 15 years constituted cruel and unusual punishment because a mandatory sentence does not allow a court to consider a juvenile defendant's youth. Like appellant in this case, Fuell did not raise this issue in the trial court.”
The 12th District noted Long and Patrick analyzed R.C. 2929.03, because the defendants in those cases were convicted of aggravated murder, while Fuell was sentenced under R.C. 2929.02, because he was convicted of murder, not aggravated murder as was Carlock, Judge Donofrio noted.
The appellate panel also found the trial court did factor in Carlock’s youth on the record at the sentencing hearing by referencing his “tender age” when considering the recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12(D)(E).
Appellate judges Cheryl L. Waite and Carol Ann Robb concurred. The case is cited State v. Carlock, 2021-Ohio-4550.


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