The Akron Legal News

Login | March 28, 2024

Partial reversal issued in Lorain County defamation case

TRACEY BLAIR
Legal News Reporter

Published: February 24, 2020

A Lorain County trial court erred by denying a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on his accuser’s defamation claim in a neighbor dispute, the 9th District Court of Appeals recently ruled.
Appellant, T.H., appealed a judgment that found him liable for assault, battery, defamation and invasion of privacy.
T.H. and appellee J.P. used to be neighbors, but their relationship was strained. T.H. said J.P. made frequent video recordings of his neighbors, while J.P. claimed that T.H.’s movements around the neighborhood on foot, by bicycle and by car were driven by a desire to harass him.
On June 22, 2014, a confrontation between the two neighbors occurred. It is undisputed that J.P. noticed T.H. riding his bicycle in their cul-de-sac, a path that took him past J.P.’s residence; that J.P. began recording video of T.H. and announced in a loud voice that he was not intimidated by T.H.’s actions, and that J.P. ultimately pulled a gun and pointed it at T.H. What happened next formed the basis for the case.
Immediately after the incident, J.P. petitioned for a civil protection order restraining T.H. The trial court denied the petition.
Meanwhile, J.P. filed a complaint against T.H. for assault and battery, defamation and invasion of privacy through intrusion upon his seclusion. J.P.’s claims against T.H. were tried to a jury. T.H. moved for a directed verdict on all claims after J.P. presented his case. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of J.P. and awarded him $13,326.99 in damages.
On appeal, T.H. argued that J.P. failed to demonstrate that T.H. made false statements and failed to present any evidence that T.H. acted with actual malice.
“With respect to the truth or falsity of T.H.’s statements, this court agrees,” 9th District Judge Lynne S. Callahan said in her 3-0 opinion.
Callahan noted that a motion for directed verdict can only be granted when, having construed the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, the trial court concludes that reasonable minds could only reach a conclusion upon the evidence submitted that is adverse to the nonmoving party. However, if there is substantial and competent evidence supporting the position of the nonmoving party and reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a trial court must deny the motion.
J.P. alleged that T.H. was liable for defamation per se because he made statements to third parties that accused J.P. of striking him and pulling a gun on him during the incident. Because J.P. alleged defamation per se, his allegations focused on the extent to which T.H.’s statements related to the firearm.
During the trial, T.H. testified he was coming back from the pool the day of the incident and was on his bike. He claimed he got off his bike because J.P. was standing in the driveway, yelling, with a camera. T.H. alleged J.P. slapped him five or six times, and he fell off his bike. As he got up, J.P. pointed a gun at him and then quickly put it away. T.H. said he did not retaliate.
T.H. admitted that months later he told some people that J.P. had committed a crime against him. J.P. did not dispute that he pulled a gun on T.H. during the incident, but maintained that he was acting in self-defense.
“Even viewing T.H.’s testimony in the light most favorable to J.P., reasonable minds could only conclude that T.H. did not, with a level of culpability of at least negligence, make a false statement that accused J.P. of a crime that subjected him to infamous punishment,” Callahn wrote. “Although T.H. and J.P.’s testimony regarding the initial moments of the confrontation on June 22, 2014, differed, there is no dispute that J.P. did, in fact, draw a firearm and direct it toward T.H. J.P.’s arguments relate not to the truth or falsity of that statement, but to the legal privilege that may have attached in his favor. A reasonable trier of fact, however, could not conclude that T.H. was negligent in his representations to third parties based on J.P.’s subsequent assertion of a legal privilege.”
Appellate judges Thomas Teodosio and Jennifer Hensal concurred that the defamation judgment be remanded. The case is cited J.P. v. T.H., 2020-Ohio-320.


[Back]