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Jurisdictional-priority rule applies in child support fraud complaint
SHERRY KARABIN
Legal News Reporter
Published: August 18, 2022
The Summit County Court of Common Pleas did not err when it dismissed a man’s fraud complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This according to a 9th District Appeals Court ruling issued on June 15, 2022.
The case dates back to an Aug. 31, 2020 complaint filed in the General Division of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas by Daryl D. Dorsey against Renita R. Henry, alleging she committed fraud by claiming he was the biological father of her now-adult son, resulting in his paying child support in excess of $15,000.
In the complaint, Dorsey argues Henry falsely represented the child’s parentage in order to get him to pay child support, which he was ordered to do by the Domestic Relations Division (the DR Court).
After the child became an adult, genetic testing confirmed Dorsey was not the biological father. The Domestic Relations Court ordered the Child Support Enforcement Agency to stop collecting any arrearages in child support and to return any payments held in escrow to Dorsey.
In his Aug. 31 complaint, Dorsey sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, pre- and post-judgment interest and costs.
Henry moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She argued the Domestic Relations Court had exclusive jurisdiction in the matter under Revised Code Section 2301.03 (I)(1) and that “even if the General Division had concurrent jurisdiction, the jurisdictional-priority rule applied in favor of the DR Court having jurisdiction.”
Dorsey argued the underlying domestic relations case had been resolved, thus the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter.
He stated that his fraud claim was “separate and apart,” further asserting that punitive damages were not available in the Domestic Relations Court. In the alternative, Dorsey requested the General Division transfer the case to the Domestic Relations Court, where his complaint could be converted to a motion for relief from judgment.
The General Division granted Henry’s motion to dismiss.
It concluded “[t]he core of the claims in Mr. Dorsey’s complaint * * * stem from the parentage and court ordered child support, both of which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [DR Court].”
The General Division further explained that “Mr. Dorsey’s requested relief was a return of the child support money he paid under the DR Court’s child support order, and that it could not issue an order that would alter that order.”
The court added that, “prior to filing his fraud complaint in the General Division, Mr. Dorsey filed a motion in the DR Court wherein he alleged that Ms. Henry had misrepresented to him that he was the father of her son, and requested reimbursement for the child support he had paid.”
In his appeal to the 9th District, Dorsey raised two assignments of error, both of which were rejected by the 9th District Court of Appeals.
In the first assignment of error, Dorsey argued the General Division erred when it granted Henry’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that “this is an issue of first impression in this Court, but that other courts and Ohio’s statutory law supports his position that the General Division does have subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint for fraud.”
In rejecting this argument, 9th District Appeals Court Presiding Judge Jennifer Hensal explained that Revised Code (R.C.) Section 2301.03(I)(1) contains a provision specific to Summit County, which says that other than cases that fall within the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction, the DR Court shall hear all cases pertaining to child support and all post-decree proceedings arising from any case pertaining to those matters.
Dorsey, however, argued that R.C. Section 3119.964(B) specifically provides that when a child support obligor obtains relief from a child support order, as he did, nothing in the statute limits any actions that may be taken by the person granted relief to recover support paid pursuant to the order from which relief was granted.
The 9th District held that, “Assuming without deciding that the General Division did have jurisdiction, the jurisdictional-priority rule applies, rendering any alleged error in the General Division’s decision harmless.”
The decision explained that “Under the jurisdictional-priority rule, * * * “‘[a]s between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked by the institution of proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of the parties.’”
In his second assignment of error, Dorsey asserts the General Division violated his due process and equal protection rights when it dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court rejected this argument “outright” because Dorsey did not raise the constitutional issues and “has not argued plain error on appeal…
“The failure to raise a constitutional issue at the trial level forfeits the right to make a constitutional argument on appeal.”
The case is cited as Dorsey v. Henry, 2022-Ohio-2023.